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I THE ARBITRAL PROCESs: AN INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION
Arbitration consists of a process for resolving disputes in a final
and binding manner outside the traditional court system. The rules
that govern arbitrations provide for flexible proceedings and do not
require the strict application of legal rules. A standard contract
provision mandating the submission of disputes to arbitration
ordinarily is the gateway to the process.!
* An earlier, abbreviated version of this Article was published in The World and I
and is reprinted here with the permission of The Washington Times.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Eason-Weinmann Institute of Comparative
Law, Tulane University. Copyright © 1996 Thomas E. Carbonneau.
1. There are two types of arbitration agreements: the submission to arbitration
under which contracting parties submit an existing dispute to arbitration and the arbitral
clause under which contracting parties submit future disputes to arbitration. Ordinarily,
parties agree to an arbitral clause and, once a dispute materializes, enter into a submission to
refer the dispute to arbitration. At the time of the demand for arbitration and agreement
thereto, the parties also draft the arbitral tribunal's terms of reference, a document of central
importance to the arbitration because it defines the tribunal's scope of adjudicatory authority.
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The agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of other possible
remedies for resolving disputes, including a formal judicial trial.2 The
parties to the arbitration agreement name the arbitrators who act as the
adjudicators of the matters submitted to arbitration.3 Arbitrators
function as private judges and are usually experts in the matter
submitted to arbitration. The arbitral tribunal's determinations, known
as awards, are usually simpler and less costly than their judicial
counterpart and are more quickly rendered. Appeal against an award
is generally either unavailable or unavailing.
4
1[ HIsToRicAL AND CONTEMPORARY STANDING OF THE ARBITRAL
REMEDY
The idea of nonjudicial dispute resolution, and the recourse to
arbitral adjudication in particular, has gained substantial standing in
the U.S. legal system in the last ten to fifteen years. Owing largely to
the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court,5 arbitration law and procedure
have emerged from the obscurity of specialized practice and entered
the adjudicatory mainstream.
The institution of arbitration, however, was not always so
blessed. Indeed, several decades ago the process of arbitration was
neither an institution nor a commonplace means of resolving disputes.
2. The parties may, however, rescind their agreement to arbitrate by common
agreement, or mutual rescission. Such an agreement would terminate the provision for
arbitration and allow the parties to pursue litigation before the courts or enter into another
dispute resolution contract.
3. It is important to note that arbitration, like a court proceeding, is a form of
adjudication (i.e., a third party hears the arbitrating parties and has the authority to render a
final and binding disposition of the case). Although the parties may settle their claim in
arbitration, arbitral proceedings are not meant to induce settlement or provide circumstances
for negotiation. Arbitration, therefore, is a modified form of the judicial proceeding. Other
remedies for dispute resolution, such as mediation, negotiation, and the mini-trial, are
nonadjudicatory devices. In these settings, the third party's function is to assist the parties in
attempting to reach a settlement. If the parties fail to agree, they must either invoke
adjudication or leave their dispute unresolved.
4. Section 10 of the U.S. Arbitration Act, for example, provides very limited
grounds for challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). The
basis for challenge is limited to gross procedural deficiencies (e.g., arbitrator corruption or
partiality, excessive exercise of arbitral authority, or glaring procedural unfairness) and does
not include either the inarbitrability defense or the public policy exception to enforcement.
5. For a discussion of the Court's decisional law, see Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 OFHO ST. J. ON
Dis. RBsOL 231 (1990).
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The history of arbitration is long-standing--dating back, for example,
to biblical times and to the romanist period. The segment of its
evolution that is germane to the present considerations can be confined
to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-the formative period
of modem legal systems.
In effect, the movement to establish functional national legal
institutions precipitated a reaction against informal, nonlegal, and
nonjudicial forms of adjudication. If courts were to function as the
national oracles of normative law and procedural justice, there was
little room for makeshift, party-confected modes of dispute resolution.
The courts were a central organ of the state and an instrument for
implementing the dictates of society's juridical creed. The mission of
achieving justice required public investiture and accountability.
Judicial responsibilities, therefore, were too august and serious to be
exercised by just anyone.
Despite its historical antecedents, arbitration-in nineteenth-
century Europe and later in the United States-was, therefore, viewed
as a process that functioned in derogation of legality. It was a bastard
remedy, incapable of being integrated into the self-respecting family of
adjudication. It had the right blood, but lacked official status and
proper standing. Arbitrators were caricatures of their judicial
siblings---"pie-splitters," who lacked requisite pedigree and
cultivation. As a result, they were unable to perform professional
adjudicatory tasks: conduct a trial and apply the law. Arbitrators
could only pretend to be what they were not and never could be: real
judges. Finally, ordinary citizens could not simply make their own law
and disregard the judicial process by the vehicle of a contract
arrangement. Society, as the collective entity, had the dominant voice
in establishing justice and determining public policy.
The stigma of illegitimacy that marked the institution of
arbitration during this period was variously expressed in different legal
systems. These regulatory regimes, however, were unified by their
common objective of dissuading or preventing parties from having
recourse to arbitration. In most nineteenth-century civil-law systems,
for example, the civil codes could not directly repudiate arbitration; it
had a presence that was too substantial in legal history and in romanist
6. For an extensive discussion of the history of arbitration, see 2 MARTIN DOMKE,
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBrTRATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL
ARBrRATION § 3.01 (Gabriel M. Wilner rev. ed., Supp. 1995).
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practices. The redactors of the codes quietly undermined the reference
to arbitration, however, by eliminating features of the law that made it
a functional remedy.
Of the two types of arbitration agreements, the codes only
recognized the submission to arbitration as a valid contract for dispute
resolution. The submission is an agreement by which existing
disputes are submitted to arbitration. The arbitral clause, the other
type of arbitration agreement, is an agreement by which future disputes
are submitted to arbitration. By outlawing the arbitral clause
(presumably to protect parties from too hastily waiving their rights to a
judicial forum and legal remedy), the legislation severely limited the
access to arbitration. When in discord, parties would be much less
likely than at the outset of their transaction to agree to anything, let
alone arbitration.
Anglo-Saxon common-law jurisdictions also participated in the
portrayal of arbitration as an untrustworthy and unacceptable
alternative to judicial adjudication. Under English law,' the "stated
case" procedure allowed courts to reform or to revise completely an
arbitrator's ruling on the legal questions that arose during the
arbitration. The case or the legal question that arose would be
submitted to a court of law for final determination. According to
English concepts, therefore, arbitrators were neither able nor qualified
to render legal rulings. Intolerant of what it considered to be 'justice
under a tree," English law converted arbitral tribunals into factfinding
bodies that were unable to provide final answers to the questions of
litigation. From a practical perspective, parties would be extremely
7. The practice referred to is still in evidence in a number of Latin American civil
codes and codes of civil procedure. Although Latin American countries, Mexico in
particular, are revising their view of arbitration in order to participate in international
commerce, there is still a lingering view that arbitration is a vehicle for Northern
imperialism.
For a discussion of the French codified law on arbitration, see JEAN ROBERT & THOMAS
E. CARBoNNEAu, THE FRENCH LAW OFARBrrRATION (1983). On the Latin American attitude
toward arbitration, see Victor MI. Garita, Conceptual Basis for a New Arbitral Statute for
Costa Rica: A New Approach in Latin America, 65 TuL L. RE. 1633 (1991).
8. See generally MICHAEL J. MuSTmL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAw AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the effect of
the 1979 Arbitration Act, ch. 42 (Eng.) on the English law of arbitration).
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reluctant to engage in arbitration if they were likely to receive a
judicial disposition of their case in any event.9
The U.S. legal system emulated the English example, espousing a
generally inhospitable attitude toward arbitration.10 Although U.S.
courts never altered or revamped the adjudicatory determinations of
arbitrators, they refused to give binding effect to arbitration agreements
until the arbitral tribunal had rendered an award. This judicial practice
allowed parties who anticipated an unfavorable ruling from the arbitral
tribunal to repudiate the agreement to arbitrate by lodging an action
before a court of law prior to the conclusion of the proceeding."
Such systemic hostility toward arbitration illustrated that
legislatures and courts were jealous of their jurisdiction, their authority,
and their roles in society. They did not want their identities usurped or
their work depreciated by arbitration. There was also a sense (perhaps
a prejudice) that the public mission of the law and adjudication could
not be accomplished in an ad-hoc fashion by private judges. The
"untrained" could not do justice or discover how legal rules should
intermediate between the public interest and individual rights. The
normative function of law, as a guide through society's conflictual
relationships, and its role in the political order-its ability to take
elitist, unpopular, minoritarian positions in a democratic state-needed
to be preserved and protected from vagaries of contractual justice.
However assessed, this rationale for the legal antipathy toward
arbitration would soon wane and eventually expire in the mid- to late-
twentieth century. Arbitration was about to be rehabilitated. Although
European jurisdictions participated in this reappraisal of arbitration,
the strength of the development has been most visible and elaborate in
the U.S. legal system. Continental civil-law systems may have been
9. See Lionel Kennedy, Note, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration
Agreements and Awards Not Subject to the New York Convention, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 75, 83
n.30 (1982).
10. On the U.S. law of arbitration, see Thomas E. Carbonneau, American and Other
National Variations on the Theme of International Commercial Arbitration, 18 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 143 (1988).
11. Some argue that the practice actually indicated support for arbitration because it
could result in enforcement. That view is as distortive as it is generous.
12. This is especially true of France. French courts and legislation were the primary
leaders in the arbitration area until recently when the U.S. Supreme Court became very
active in the area. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Cartesian Logic and Frontier Politics:




attuned to the role arbitration could play in international commerce,
but it would be the U.S. Supreme Court that would envision arbitral
adjudication as a means of refashioning the social role and function of
judicial justice.
III. THE U.S. ARBrTRATIONACr
In 1925, with the enactment of the U.S. Arbitration Act,1 3 the
U.S. Congress declared the rehabilitation of arbitral justice and dispute
resolution. Renouncing the precedent of English law, the legislation
expressly terminated the U.S. judicial hostility to arbitration. It
proclaimed that arbitration agreements were valid contracts
constituting a lawful exercise by parties of their contractual rights.
The courts were instructed to view arbitration agreements as "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable" contracts' 4 --in effect, to desist from
their practice of frustrating the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
As significant as the support for arbitration agreements was the Act's
provision for limited judicial supervision of arbitral awards. 5 This
feature of the legislation guaranteed that the outcome of arbitration
would be as binding and as unassailable as the promise to participate
in the process.
These provisions anticipated, in effect, the modem, world-wide
legislative legitimization of arbitration. Primarily because of the needs
of an emerging international business community, arbitration would
shed its suspect status and gain standing as a recognized adjudicatory
remedy. The legislation would also spawn in U.S. law a progressive
reconsideration of the value and of the very character of adjudication
through arbitration. In the end, minimalist procedural and substantive
guarantees under the law would be altered and arbitration's
fundamental role and identity would be recast once again.
These radical developments could not be anticipated at the time
of the enactment of the legislation. Indeed, the immediate
consequences of the promulgation of the Act were consistent with its
underlying goals. The federal courts sustained the contractual recourse
to arbitration, and engaged only in the limited, legislatively authorized
review of arbitral awards. Pursuant to the intent of the statute,
13. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1994)).
14. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
15. See id § 10 (1994).
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arbitration became accepted as a viable and binding remedy in
commercial and maritime transactions. There, seasoned business
people dealt with one another through standard practices and did not
want their relationships disrupted by protracted legal proceedings.
In effect, arbitration provided a means by which merchants could
resolve their disputes "in-house." It allowed them to appoint
knowledgeable adjudicators aware of trade customs, to present their
case in a reasonable and informal setting, and to have the matter
decided quickly in a final fashion. Arbitration had established itself as
a premier mechanism for achieving commercial justice.
IV. FEDERALISM AND LARGER JuDIcIAL DESIGN FOR ARBITRATION
The impetus for the judicial articulation of a more ambitious
vision of arbitration came initially from the conflict of federal and state
law. Despite the rehabilitation of arbitration in federal law, many
states continued to have statutes that were antagonistic to the
alternative process. These statutes generally disallowed the recourse to
pre-dispute arbitration agreements on the basis of public policy. Even
willing, sophisticated parties were not allowed to relinquish their right
to have their day in court prior to the emergence of a dispute. The
paternalism of the approach was transparent, but it also reflected
understandable concern about the integrity of law and the protection of
rights.
Notwithstanding the misgivings in state laws, federal courts
continued to apply the mandate of the U.S. Arbitration Act wherever
substantive federal jurisdiction could reach. As a "substitute for
industrial strife," for example, arbitration became, through the
pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, the remedy of choice in
labor matters. 6 There, as well, expertise, procedural flexibility, and
nonlegalistic determinations best suited the character of disputes and
the needs of parties.
The coexistence of countervailing state and federal laws on
-arbitration eventually became untenable, especially in litigation in
which the federal courts were obligated to apply state law. In these
cases, which reached the federal judiciary solely on the nonsubstantive
16. See FRANK ELKouRI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBnTRATION WORKS 5 (4th ed.




ground of diversity of the litigants' citizenship, federal courts-under
the celebrated Erie doctrine"7 -could be required to apply a state law
hostile to arbitration. This resulted in a direct conflict between the
federal court's duty to enforce arbitration agreements under section 2
of the U.S. Arbitration Act and its obligation under Erie to apply the
provisions of state statutes. Necessary constitutional regard for the
state authority to legislate and the balance between state and federal
power, however, mandated that the federal courts live with and adapt
to the conflict.
A. Enter the U.S. Supreme Court
It is at this juncture that the U.S. Supreme Court embarked upon
its campaign to insulate arbitration from all possible legal challenges.
Its early opinions contained doctrine that remained roughly within the
circumference of the enacted legislation. The holdings addressed
specific legal issues and, by comparison to later rulings, were timid
and hesitating pronouncements. Nevertheless, they announced a much
longer journey: the march toward a wide and boundary-less concept
of arbitration, founded purely upon self-proclaimed judicial policy.
As to the conflict between the federal regime on arbitration and
state laws, the Court's disposition was elliptical on the surface, but
nevertheless clear in its direction. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court held that Congress had the
authority to command that the federal courts rule in a particular way on
certain issues.'8 The federal legislation on arbitration represented such
a directive and the federal courts were obligated to acquiesce to this
congressional command even when their jurisdiction was based solely
on diversity of citizenship. Moreover, the federal legislation,
according to the Court, governed a purely procedural matter; because
substantive rights were not involved, there could be no constitutional
conflict between state and federal authority to legislate. Despite the
evasive, somewhat tortuous reasoning, the Court's message was clear:
The federal courts were to apply the federal law on arbitration
whenever they entertained an arbitration question, regardless of Erie
and claims for safeguarding states' authority to legislate in the area.
17. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. 388 U.S. 395,403-04(1967).
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The slight-of-hand in the reasoning was obvious. For example,
asserting that arbitration law was merely a matter of procedure was
hardly believable in light of the federal legislation's consecration of the
contractual right to arbitrate. Moreover, the position that there was no
conflict between federal and state law barely masked the naked
assertion of federal power. The Court's decision in Prima Paint made
clear that uniformity of approach, at least among the federal courts,
was paramount on the Court's decisional agenda. A revolution in legal
rights and protections had not yet been instigated or achieved, but it
had been adumbrated.
A subsequent case, Wilko v. Swan, attested to the Court's
moderation of design in interpreting the federal law on arbitration at
this time.'9  Wilko involved claims of securities fraud under the
Securities Act of 1933. The 1933 Act was designed to bring stability
to the financial marketplace after the 1929 stock market crash and
instituted special remedies for protecting individual investors. In its
ruling, the Court denied effect to a pre-dispute arbitration clause
contained in a contract for brokerage services, reasoning that the
public policy underlying the securities legislation exceptionally
outweighed the competing public policy in the U.S. Arbitration Act.20
Wilko, therefore, established a measured demarcation between the
province of the public interest and the remedial domain of arbitration.
Adjudication through arbitration could not be countenanced
everywhere-especially not in the face of congressional declarations
of exclusive judicial jurisdiction (as in the 1933 Act) and where
weaker parties could be abused and were in need of protection.
Arbitration was a dispute resolution alternative in specialty fields
where self-regulation was the order of the day and parties were equally
positioned. Such a restriction of the scope of application of arbitration
was born of the nature of the remedy and of the disputes it was
intended to address. It did not compromise arbitration's adjudicatory
standing, but simply gave it appropriate definition.
B. The March Begins
Ensuing events robbed the federal judicial doctrine on arbitration
of its balance and moderation. First, the Court embarked upon an
19. 346 U.S. 427,435-38 (1953).
20. Id. at 434-38.
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ever-expanding endorsement of international commercial arbitration,21
viewing it as critical to the U.S. interest in international trade and
commerce. Following the U.S. ratification of the New York
Arbitration Convention (the principal treaty on international
arbitration 2 ), the Court held, in effect, that international arbitrators
could rule upon at least some disputes that arose not from the
contractual relationship as such but under federal statutory law, despite
the reference in these statutes to exclusive judicial jurisdiction.' The
exclusive jurisdiction of domestic U.S. courts was inapplicable,
according to the Court, because of the international character of the
transactions and the special adjudicatory needs of the international
business community.24 Arbitration provided neutrality, expertise, and
enforceability in transborder commercial relations, while litigation
before municipal courts yielded primarily the uncertainty that
proceeded from the conflict of jurisdiction, law, and judgments.
Second, the Court revisited the question of state and federal
authority to regulate arbitration, emboldened to some degree by its
position on international arbitration. It now proclaimed the federal law
on arbitration to have a considerably enhanced scope.' Reaffirming
its prior disposition that federal courts were obligated to apply the
federal law on arbitration even in diversity cases, the Court then
extended that obligation to state courts. The Court held that state
courts sitting in state-law cases must apply the provisions of the
federal legislation whenever some basis, no matter how minimal,
existed for applying federal law.26 This was accompanied by
declarations that, where federal law could apply, state laws that
21. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628-30 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974).
22. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1959) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1994)). The New York Arbitration Convention was intended to and actually operates as the
universal charter on international commercial arbitration. It provides for a high level of
uniformity on the enforcement of awards, a critical phase of the process.
23. See supra note 21 (cases cited therein).
24. See supra note 21 (cases cited therein).
25. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
26. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, No. 95-559, 1996 WL 262287 (U.S.
May 20, 1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985);
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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contravened the Federal Arbitration Act were unconstitutional. 27 The
basis for the application and supremacy of federal law was the rather
elastic notion of interstate commerce.
In seeking absolute national uniformity on arbitration, the Court
rendered state laws that were antagonistic to arbitration inapplicable in
litigation that otherwise was governed by state law and held before
state courts. In effect, the right to arbitrate had become a substantive
federal right protected by the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution. The protection of that right would extend wherever the
concept of interstate commerce could be made to reach. Indeed, one
might speculate that the exercise of the right itself created substantive,
federal question jurisdiction.
The Court also, suddenly and inexplicably, merged its domestic
and international doctrines on arbitration into a unitary arbitration
law.28 The decisions on international arbitration lost their transborder
and, to some extent, their commercial specificity. In a number of
securities cases and later in a civil rights case29 involving age
discrimination in an employment context, the Court advanced the view
that even claims that arose under statutes with public policy
implications could be heard by arbitrators in either the international or
domestic setting.
The jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals had considerably widened.
Arbitrators were not limited to ruling on maritime, commercial,
contractual, and labor matters, but were also entitled, as a matter of
law, to rule upon securities, RICO, civil rights, and any other type of
claim, no matter what the import to the public interest, provided the
arbitration agreement did not specifically exclude the arbitrators' right
to adjudicate such matters.
These decisions, in effect, spawned the securities arbitration
industry. They also established, for the first time, that arbitration was
an acceptable remedy in the area of consumer disputes-even when
the agreement to arbitrate was basically a unilateral and probably an
adhesionary contract.' The Court's articulation of an "emphatic
27. See Doctor's Assocs., 1996 WL 262287; Allied-Bruce, 115 S. Ct. 834; Perry,
482 U.S. 483; Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. 213; Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
28. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
29. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
30. English law provides for a more adapted and reasonable position on the question
of whether arbitration is permissible in the context of consumer disputes. There, the
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federal policy" on arbitration amounted to a revolution in the
constitutional guarantees afforded to U.S. citizens.31 For all practical
purposes, however, the Court's stance on the question was buttressed
by the U.S. Congress in subsequent legislation that implicitly affirmed
the Court's doctrine.32
As a result of these "advances" in the federal law on arbitration, it
is now possible for a major bank,33 a car manufacturer or dealership,34
a financial broker,35 or any other economic actor to insert a provision
for final and binding arbitration in a purchase agreement or service
contract and make it indispensable to the transaction. The consumer, if
at all aware of the provision and its meaning, must either accept it as
stated or forego doing business with the actor in question or the entire
industry.
Federal law no longer protects the right to engage voluntarily in
arbitration, but rather safeguards the right of some parties to force
other parties into the process. Arbitration is not a matter of contract; it
is a matter of law and, worse yet, a matter of judicial policy.
Paradoxically, individual rights are abridged to enforce the private
contractual right to engage in arbitration.
Recent cases indicate continued exuberance for arbitration on the
part of the Court. Last term, the Court decided no less than four
submission agreement is the only lawful contract for arbitration in these circumstances. In
other words, a consumer may only agree to arbitration once a dispute has arisen.
31. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985).
32. In 1988, the U.S. Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act so as to sustain
the reference to arbitration and, in keeping with the U.S. Supreme Court's position, to favor
arbitration by restricting or basically eliminating possible challenges to the process. For
example, new section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides for immediate recourse
against any federal court ruling that is unfavorable to arbitration and denies the same relief
against rulings that favor arbitration. The Congressional intent is clear and is entirely in
agreement with the Court's decisional law. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 15, 16 (1994).
33. Bank of America in San Francisco recently placed arbitration agreements in all
of its service contracts with its customers who had bank accounts.
34. Several car manufacturers and car dealerships insert arbitration clauses into sales
contracts for the purchase of cars by customers.
35. Most, if not all, financial brokerage firms have arbitration provisions in their
agreements with their customers. It is basically an industry-wide practice that is perfectly
lawful. The agreement to arbitration is a prerequisite for clients seeking to do business with
the firms. Soon after the ruling in the McMahon case, a Massachusetts law declared the
practice of unilateral predispute arbitration clauses in brokerage services contracts to be
unlawful. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the determination that that law was preempted
by the Federal Arbitration Act. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114,
1114-15 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
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arbitration cases. The number of cases reflects the importance the
Court attaches to the law in this area.36 The decisions affirm the
supremacy of federal law over state law and the position that the
recourse to arbitration should be immunized from any legal
challenge.37 The Court also affirms the position that arbitrators have a
warrant to exercise the full range of judicial and remedial powers by
authorizing them in effect to award exemplary relief.38 Finally, some
content is added to the Court's evolving and curious contractualist
concept of arbitration 39 -a notion by which contracting parties can
divest completely the legal system of any supervisory or regulatory
authority over arbitration.
C. A Critique
The Supreme Court's brief for arbitration spans a number of
Courts and Chief Justices and generally has unified the various
ideological strains in the Court's membership. The Court views
alternative remedies, arbitration in particular, as a means of alleviating
the congestion in the federal court docket. Rather than argue for new
courts and for the expenditure of additional public resources upon the
judiciary, the Court prefers to push cases in the direction of arbitration.
The perfect cover for this managerial objective is the assertion of the
need to purify the judiciary of any residue of judicial hostility toward
arbitration and to fulfil the expressed legislative goals of the federal
law on arbitration.
Through its appearance of devotion to arbitration and to systemic
considerations of separation of powers, the Court can more effectively
ride herd upon the federal judicial bureaucracy. It seems to matter
little what the ultimate implications are for individual rights or the
36. Many writs are filed each year, requesting that the U.S. Supreme Court review
inferior court rulings on constitutional grounds. The Court accepts for review only a very
small percentage of the thousands of cases submitted-as few as one or two percent. To
have the Court review and rule upon four arbitration cases, then, is literally a landmark
event. See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Current Awareness Commentary, 132 L. Ed. 2d C-1 to C-2
(Aug. 1995).
37. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV SKY REEFER, 115 S. Ct. 2322,
2329, 1995 AMC 1817, 1824 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995).
38. See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216-19.
39. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995)
(holding that "a court must defer to an arbitrator's arbitrability decision when the parties
submitted that matter to arbitration").
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institution of arbitration. In effect, the Court's response to the problem
of access to federal courts is to make them even less accessible.
Despite the burdens that are imposed upon the federal system for the
prosecution of drug offenders and other criminal defendants, is it wise
to push so much civil litigation outside the purview of the courts,
when issues of significant public moment and basic fairness are
implicated?
Arbitration was not conceived of as a judicial trial. It is
privatized justice, funded exclusively by the arbitrating parties and
controlled by them, the arbitrators, and private arbitral institutions, like
the American Arbitration Association or the International Chamber of
Commerce. The arbitral proceeding is not a public hearing, and-
depending upon the language of the arbitration agreement-is not
governed by the rules of judicial procedure or, in many instances, by
the substantive rules of law. Arbitrators rarely (in domestic practice at
least) issue reasons with their awards and the prospect of judicial
scrutiny of the determination is virtually nonexistent. In the proverbial
language, you get only one bite at the apple in arbitration, and the
result is only as good as your arbitrator. Moreover, the detemaination
is not intended to serve the public interest, but only that of the parties
who have paid for the arbitration.
The Court's unbridled support for arbitration is at once surprising
and unnecessary. The Court's willingness to curtail major
constitutional and political interests-such as states' rights and
federalism, civil rights, federal regulatory authority over the
marketplace, and generally, due process guarantees-to bolster
arbitration benefits neither the legal culture nor, in the long run, the
institution of arbitration itself. In addition, the quality of the Court's
reasoning in these cases detracts from the credibility of the announced
doctrine. To have the highest court in a legal system dominated by the
technicalities of legal procedure state that arbitration is a "mere form
of trial' ' that does not affect the content of the statutory rights
submitted to arbitration, is incredible and preposterous. Foreign and
even domestic arbitrators will view legal claims arising under U.S.
statutes differently than federal judges and will conduct hearings in a
different fashion.




Unless the structure of arbitration is radically altered, it is not a
suitable adjudicatory mechanism for every type of claim. One of the
presumably lasting lessons of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement is precisely that there is no universal device for dispute
resolution. Furthermore, effective remedies must be customized to the
individual characteristics of different disputes. In a word, arbitration is
no more of a panacea than the adversarial trial. Surely, there must be
some limit as to what arbitration can achieve and some remaining
public function for the courts and the law to perform.
Finally, and this is the most disconcerting feature of the
decisional law, the Court does not communicate in its opinions any
sense of having a fundamental understanding of the institution of
arbitration-either of its history, ideology, or actual operation.
Standard notions in the area have no presence in the reasoning and a
cohesive architecture of law is lacking. Logical difficulties and
intellectual problems are dismissed by invoking slogans,
misrepresenting prior opinions, and incanting ritualistic confidence in
arbitration. Nowhere does the Court attempt to provide a serious
definition of the role and function of arbitration and alternative
remedies in the American legal process. The meaning of this "new
age" and everything else is left up to the individual contract as a
surrogate for regulatory authority and normative law.41
This saga of "legal revolution through arbitration" has yet other
nefarious consequences. Converting arbitration into a privately funded
second court system has had an impact upon the institution of
arbitration as well. As the jurisdiction of arbitration grew, so did
lawyer participation in the process and the adversarial tenor of arbitral
proceedings. Lawyering practices-extensive, party-conducted pre-
trial discovery, depositions, direct and cross-examination-are
redefining the character of arbitral procedure and justice.
As a result, there is growing dissatisfaction with arbitral
adjudication in both specialized and nonspecialized fields.4 2 Arbitral
41. See First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1924.
42. In the last 18 months, articles have appeared in both the Wall Street Journal and
Barron's indicating that there is growing investor dissatisfaction with securities arbitration.
See, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs & Michael Siconolfi, Losing Battles: Investors Fare Poorly
Fighting Wall Street and May Do Worse; In Challenging Brokers, They Must Use
Arbitration, But Finns Set the Rules, WAML ST. J., Feb. 5, 1995, at Al; Richard Karp, For
Brokerage Finns, Arbitration Has Turned Unexpectedly Nasty, BARRON's, Feb. 21, 1994, at
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proceedings are becoming protracted, more expensive, and more
destructive of the litigants' relationship. Ironically, the Court's
steadfast support of arbitration may result, in the end, in a depreciation
of the institution. Specialized groups may lose a functional remedy
and access to justice would remain difficult for the general population.
V. ARBrTRATON AND ADR
The development of arbitration law has been allied generally to
the recognition and endorsement of ADR,43 the movement toward
alternative dispute resolution to achieve greater efficiency and
humanity in adjudicatory practices. In fact, the federal court support
for arbitration uplifted the standing and importance of ADR. The goal
of ADR mechanisms (such as negotiation, mediation, and the mini-
trial) is to provide structured frameworks by which third parties can
assist disputing parties to reach their own resolution of their conflict.
These mechanisms do not provide for adjudication, but rather attempt
to foster agreement and settlement between the parties. In the age of
limited resources and cost reduction, the touting of ADR has become
quite popular. According to the consecrated expression, it allows the
parties to "self-empower"--to exercise creativity and responsibility in
the fashioning of solutions to their disputes.
The central difficulty, here again, is exemplified by the
proselytizing tactics associated with these remedies. There is a denial
of established hierarchy and methodology, no recognition of
overarching interests-in street parlance, "just let the parties do it if
they want to and perhaps let's force them to do it because it's better for
them." ADR redefines the role of law in society and the public
mission of the lawyer, but advocates never put content to that
redefinition nor do they address the larger implications of the change
they espouse. "Just try the new elixir," they seem to say, "and it will
make you feel better." Although "lawyer-bashing" is a popular and
invigorating sport, how valuable and necessary are lawyer services in
our social and political community? Will the abandonment of
traditional lawyer functions advance the interests of society? Will the
15. The principal complaints center upon the adversarialization of the proceedings that
proceeds from growing lawyer participation in the process.
43. See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAu, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION:
MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS (1989).
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surrogate services help us to discover and sustain our communitarian
values and ethics?
ADR and arbitration appear to beckon in a better direction and
toward a new day. There is the prospect of transcending the
limitations of human nature and of discovering finally the plenitude of
fulfilled religion. Do mediation and arbitration or conciliation and
negotiation truly open a path to higher-minded dispute resolution or
are they illusions by which to avoid for a time, at least, the unpleasant
aspects of social life in a human community? Can these devices assist
us in better confronting abortion, capital punishment, racial
discrimination or racial backlash, and each other? Advocates of ADR
appear to mistake style and structure for content. We cannot place the
Constitution or lawmaking institutions in abeyance for ADR
experiments without paying a substantial price in terms of our social
and political existence.
ADR offers a scattered and entangling methodology. If
arbitration isn't what you want throughout your "conflict," you can
always put in a rider for mediation at some stage of the dispute
process. Then, your remedy becomes, by your very wish, "med-arb."
If arbitrators, mediators, and conciliators cannot get you to "agree,"
then you should rent the services of a retired or out-of-office judge-
"rent-a-judge." Or, you may want particular devices for certain phases
of your evolution through crisis and toward a remedy. You should
then use one technique for factfinding, another to discuss how you
"feel" about all of this dispute resolution experience, and yet another to
guide you back through the maze of menus to your original problem.
In addition, there are now both public and private forms of
ADR.'44 Government agencies and selected federal courts employ
ADR techniques to fulfil their public mandates. An agency does not
regulate, but provides a framework for adjusting conflicts and
disagreement between itself and the people over whom it has legal
jurisdiction. Federal judges are authorized by Congress to experiment
with mediation. The judges cease to hear cases and to apply the law;
rather, they attempt to guide the parties to their "own" solutions. How
many litigants are willing to tell the judge who is to hear their case if
44. For a discussion of this distinction, see ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE RESOLUTION
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., forthcoming 1997). See also E. WENDY TRAcHTE-HuBER &




they do not reach a mediated agreement that he or she has failed as a
mediator of disputes? There is now in the public sector a rash of
attempts, in the name of economy and cost reduction, to integrate
ADR techniques into all facets of local, state, and federal government.
This layer of ADR is added to the existing process in the private sector
where ADR is now used to resolve all types of disputes. And that
layer of ADR has been added to the traditional use of arbitration in
specialty areas.
All of these disparate forms of ADR explode forth, and there is
little in the way of public regulation (but for the concept of freedom of
contract), and of definition of roles, ethics, and jurisdiction. Everyone,
however, appears to be convinced that they are doing the right thing,
"making a difference," and acting for the greater or greatest good and
benefit of human kind.
The fallacy of the thinking lies in its facility. ADR, with its
multiple choices, in the final analysis, may not depart so dramatically
from the traditional judicial remedies. It may, in fact, only delay,
confound, and complicate that eventual recourse. It may create more
and different work for legal and other professionals. More
importantly, the application of ADR techniques may not alter at all the
reality of conflict or of dispute resolution in most settings. Finally,
rather than dispose of our need for law and adjudication, ADR may
only postpone and confuse our attempt to grapple with the significance
of law in American society.
There is little doubt that the American form of adversarial
litigation is problematic. There is reason to complain mightily about
the length, cost, and debilitation of litigants and American society
through the current legal process. Legal reform is necessary and so is a
more realistic understanding of the limits and possibilities of litigation
and of the legal method. The compromise of the fundamental
guarantee of due process of law and equal protection, however, is
clearly an excessive price to pay to achieve the necessary
modifications.
Privately funded, nonpublic, nonnormative alternatives are
simply not an adequate substitute for the public mission of the law.
Arbitration fares well in highly defined, largely self-regulated
communities, the activities of which are governed by established
customary practice. Mediation is a viable mechanism in circum-
stances in which there is a substantial motivation for agreement
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between the parties and in which there will be a continuing
relationship. The specific area of child custody disputes following
divorce is an illustration.
Neither alternative remedy can replace the social, historical, and
cultural investment a community makes in a national legal system.
The painstaking quest to determine what is right and to achieve what is
fair cannot be eliminated from the existence or responsibilities of the
community. Changes in trial procedures and in forms of liability can
be attempted, but the need for a rule of law simply cannot be
abstracted from our collective mind simply because it has become
problematic. Part of an answer may reside in a redefinition of the
training and function of lawyers. Different segments of the profession
could perform different professional tasks. A special group of lawyers
could function as dispute counselors. They would offer neutral advice
to clients about available remedies and procedures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The late twentieth century is beset by revolutions. Past practices
are under serious challenge. Most of these upheavals somehow
implicate arbitration and commerce.
The quest for global economic advantage, for example, has
generated regional economic alliances that seek to replace the nation-
state. To varying degrees, the European Union and NAFTA are, of
course, the best illustration of the attempt to erect regional economies
and political institutions.
The ideological and economic collapse of the Soviet Union and
its satellite states represents another revolution in the world geo-
political order. After the downfall of Communism, these countries are
attempting to rebuild their societies, infrastructures, and marketplaces
by attracting foreign investment. A necessary part of the undertaking
involves espousing Western legal and commercial practices, which, in
turn, means endorsing the process of international commercial
arbitration.
These radical restructurings converge in a number of ways with
the redefinition of American justice through arbitration. Each
development involves the delegation or subordination of political,
ideological, and cultural authority to the dynamics of commerce and
the dictates of commercial practices. In each set of circumstances, the
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hope is that commerce and the incentive for profit will fill the void and
provide solutions to the complex problems that were left in the
aftermath of the revolution. The creative energies of politics, ideology,
and culture appear immobilized by the enormity of the tasks that lie
ahead. Privatization and adopting the approach of the commercial
bottom-line perhaps can stabilize problems, provide a functional
lucidity, and point to a pathway out of a morass of difficulties.
In NAFrA, for example, when trade policy disputes between the
participating national governments become irreconcilable, provision is
made for delegating at least part of the resolution to private arbitrators.
The goal, in effect, is to facilitate decisionmaking by transferring the
conflict to a nonpolitical, nonpublic, and nonsovereign framework.
Because procedural factors can influence the decisionmaking process,
however, there is little agreement as to the composition of the
projected arbitral tribunals. In other words, privatizing trade policy
conflicts becomes merely another avenue for temporizing and
allowing time to adjust countervailing positions.
Despite its considerable success in some dispute resolution areas,
simply invoking the process of arbitration does not magically provide
a solution or lessen the perplexities of establishing acceptable trade
policy positions between sovereign governments that, in spite of their
partnership, are in different stages of economic development. Private
dispute resolution and the commercial approach have distinct
advantages, but cannot be vehicles for resolving conflicts or problems
that require other, less expedient solutions. Commercial practices
cannot simply lend their efficiency and penchant for reasonable
settlement to political problems that trigger national self-interest and
divide cultures, nations, and national economies.
Rebuilding the former Communist states creates even more
massive problems-the least of which at times appears to be the
building of a legal system. There is, here as well, a great reliance upon
the commercial ethos and the expression at least of rhetorical
confidence in arbitration to resolve commercial conflicts. The real,
rather than symbolic, passage of these countries from Communism to
European-styled social democracy is a harrowing endeavor; even
rudimentary achievements are likely to take decades. The trappings of
democratization and Westernization are present, but, in the face of the
upheaval and anarchy, prior practices appear more reassuring than the
promises of the future. These states need and want the codification of
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law to take place overnight. Founding legal institutions, however,
cannot be simply imported or transplanted-at least not without
generations of gradual adaptation.
How much is really changed in the new Russian Federation? In
order to attract foreign investment with the image of a relatively stable
business climate, the Russian Federation enacted an arbitration
statute.45 The impression that was communicated by the legislation
was that Russian parties could now enter into standard arbitration
agreements, would participate in ordinary arbitration litigation, and
make good on arbitral awards. Actual practice, however, is quite
different from the projections.
The Russian view of arbitration has not been altered by the
statute. Russians still think of arbitration as litigation under local law
before Russian commercial courts. Moreover, would-be arbitral
awards face little likelihood of successful enforcement if rendered
against a Russian party. Doing business in Russia, for this and other
reasons, is still perilous. The hold of the past remains strong.
Like a new adjudicatory day, the image of a new world order
awash in harmony and rationality continues to be aspirational. The
dilemma of living in human society is more, not less complex;
exorbitant demands are being placed upon dwindling resources.
Commerce and its predilection for arbitration cannot possibly function
as vehicles for giving content to national culture and national political
values. There are no facile, blanket solutions to the problems that
confront either the world order or individual national societies. To
move toward light rather than darkness, the new societies must begin
the painful task of building real foundations and making choices that
are difficult to the point of cruelty.
The temptation in the U.S. legal process to undertake law reform
and curtail legal rights by heralding arbitration or other ADR
mechanisms should not be indulged without great caution.
Sloganeering wins elections, but does little to alter the real course of
events in society. The problems with legal adjudication and lawyering
practices are enormous, but these problems will not be resolved by
embracing superficial solutions.
45. See David E. Wagoner, New Russian Insurance Law and Arbitration Agreement,
22 INT'L Bus. LAw. 20 (1994).
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Some time ago, the residents of a particularly bad public housing
development in Chicago declared that they were willing to waive their
right against illegal search and seizure to allow police to address the
project's problem with drug dealers.46 This was an act of desperation
in the face of equally desperate circumstances. The media coverage
emphasized the enormity of the drug problem rather than the profound
unlawfulness of the solution. Only a few years ago, such a proposal
would have been unthinkable and, if advanced, would have been
roundly and rightly denounced. The core political culture of a society
cannot be altered fundamentally without producing irretrievable
modifications in the character of that society. No amount of despair or
even human suffering is worth the denial of individual freedom or of
democratic political heritage.
The Chicago example speaks eloquently to many different
concerns; it curiously parallels the U.S. Supreme Court's decisional
approach to arbitration by placing the protection of rights in an
ancillary position among protected values. The primary dissenters
against the evolution of the Court's case law on arbitration have all
anchored their opposition in a protection of rights argument. Each
dissenter proceeded from an intimate acquaintance with the rights that
were being compromised to arbitration. The dissenters knew from
past practice and professional experience that the rights involved were
important to American law and society. Former Justice Douglas, a
commercial lawyer of some repute, inveighed against the arbitration of
securities claims in a prophetic dissent in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,
Inc.47 Justice Stevens, a highly regarded scholar in antitrust law and a
seasoned jurist, advanced a poignant critique of the arbitrability of
antitrust claims in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.48 He renewed, with vigor and force, his objections to
the Court's misguided arbitration doctrine in the recent Vimar case.
Finally, Justice Thomas, long an advocate of states' rights, undertook
46. See Report on the Cabrini Green Housing Project (CNN television broadcast,
Mar. 1993).
47. 417 U.S. 506,521-34(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. 473 U.S. 614, 640-66 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Vinar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV SKY REEFER, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330-
37, 1995 AMC 1817, 1828-39 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in the Terminix and Mastrobuono cases ° a rigorous and trenchant
analysis of the Court's inconsistency on the state-law question.
These voices remind us of the gravity of the interests that are
involved in this judicial reorchestration of the Bill of Rights. If we are
unable to afford some of the social institutions we have, we should at
least be allowed to vote upon which ones we are willing to expunge
from our social life. The institution of arbitration is not simply being
adapted to embrace a larger dispute resolution destiny. It is being
exploited as a tool by which to achieve a surreptitious reduction of
justice services in our society. American society is no longer
characterized by a transcending rule of law, but rather by an expiring
legal culture. Commercial expediency and privatized justice through
arbitration may produce the desired efficiency in the short run, but
what manner of political society will the United States be in the
twenty-first century if, in desperation and despair, we rid it of the
normative function of law and basic procedural justice?
50. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 845-51 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212,
1219-23 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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